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Advocates of capital market liberalization have long argued that it would 
lead to greater stability.  Countries that are integrated into the global financial 
system could, if they faced a negative shock, borrow from the rest of the world.  
This would allow cross-country smoothing (Stiglitz 2000). 
There is, by now, considerable evidence against this conclusion.  (See 
Kose et al. 2003.) Indeed, the IMF seemed surprised when the empirical evidence 
contradicted this theoretical proposition. (See Kose et al. 2006).   But they should 
not have been.  It should have been evident that developing countries that 
liberalized have been more subject to crises and volatility. (See Ocampo et al., 
2008).   
One reason for these adverse outcomes is that capital flows have not 
behaved in the way that was hypothesized.  Capital flows to and from developing 
countries are often pro-cyclical.  Given this, it would have been difficult to see 
how capital market liberalization could have reduced variability.   
One explanation of these procyclical capital flows is that “bankers don’t 
like to lend to those who need the money.”  Adverse shocks induce them to 
reduce their lending.   
There are other possible explanations for why liberalization would be 
associated with an increase in, say, the volatility of consumption and the lowering 
of expected utility. For instance, Stiglitz (2008) has developed a life cycle model 
in which, without capital market liberalization, positive productivity shocks lead 
to intertemporal smoothing; individuals save more, thus increasing wages of 
future generations.  In effect, the benefits of a productivity shock at time t are 
shared with future generations.  Capital market liberalization, then, may result in 
greater volatility in consumption, as the generation in which the positive 
productivity shock occurs gets to reap the full benefits for itself.   
This paper explores a third set of explanations for the adverse 
consequences of capital market liberalization, illustrated by global financial 
crises, such as those that occurred in 1998 and 2008.  A failure in one or more 
countries can quickly spread elsewhere.  Since the adverse effects of a downturn 
can be great, it raises the question:  can these periodic but highly negative effects 
overwhelm the putative positive effects of income smoothing? 
The existence of these adverse effects was itself a puzzle—at least within 
the standard models that had assumed that by sharing risks, the effect of any 
shock would be mitigated.  Indeed, the notion that risk sharing would lead to a 
more stable global financial system was one of the reasons that certain regulators 
believed we were in a new era of the “Great Moderation.”  For the first time, risk 
was so widely shared that the world could undertake more risk, growing more 
rapidly and more stably.  Needless to say, things haven’t turned out the way that 
was anticipated.   
1
Stiglitz: Contagion, Liberalization and Globalization
Brought to you by | Columbia University Law Library New York (Columbia University Law Library New York)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 6/18/12 8:19 PM
There are, in turn, two possible explanations for why risk diversification 
didn’t work in the way that many had hoped. The first is that the financial 
institutions didn’t understand the risks that they confronted and/or that their 
deceptive accounting practices, designed to mislead regulators, investors, and the 
tax collector alike, also deceived themselves.  The result was that they held on to 
many of the toxic mortgages; risk was not in fact diversified and spread out. 
There is a second explanation, and that is that the central models 
employed by macro- and financial economists were fundamentally flawed.1  They 
assume a structure that says that if risk is widely diversified, the system will be 
more stable and expected utility will be higher.   
Curiously, the advocates of liberalization have never fully believed this.  
For they have always worried about the risk of contagion once a crisis starts.  
But, as we have noted, most of the mechanisms by which contagion occurs are 
associated with financial market interlinkages.2  This implies that there is a cost 
associated with greater financial or capital market integration—the risk that a 
problem in one country will lead to problems elsewhere.  Even without, say, 
financial market interlinkages, there can be extensive interdependencies through 
which a shock in one part of the system can be transmitted to others.  Any bank 
making a real estate loan would have been affected by the breaking of the real 
estate bubble.  But financial market interlinkages can exacerbate the contagion of 
problems from one economic unit to another. 
The word “contagion” itself is associated with the transmission of 
diseases; and the traditional way of reacting to worries about contagion is 
“quarantining,” that is, breaking the links between the diseased individual and the 
rest of society.  The more integrated a society, the more rapidly can diseases 
spread.   
A coherent analysis of the desirability of financial and capital market 
liberalization should, accordingly, take into account the benefits of risk sharing 
when things work well—and the costs through contagion, when things don’t.  
Remarkably, most of the literature has not done so, treating the benefits of 
integration and the management of the risks of contagion as if they were 
separable.   
A moment’s reflection suggests one of the reasons that standard models 
have gone astray:  they make strong mathematical assumptions under which risk 
sharing is always desirable.  With convex technologies and concave utility 
                                                
1 The first explanation focuses on a different flaw in the standard model employed by macro- and 
financial economists—the assumption of rationality.  Obviously, if the banks had been fully 
rational—in the way that term is usually used-- they would not have retained so much of the risk.   
2 There are other mechanisms, e.g. trade, but these work more slowly and are more muted; if trade 
were the only mechanism for contagion, IMF intervention in the East Asia crisis would have taken 
on a markedly different form. 
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functions, risk sharing is always beneficial.  Thus, the more globally integrated 
the world economy, the better are risks “dispersed.”  But if technologies are not 
convex, then risk sharing can lower expected utility.  While simplistic models 
typically employed in economics assume convexity, the world is rife with non-
convexities.  Information structures and externalities themselves give rise to a 
natural set of convexities.3  Learning processes (e.g. associated with learning by 
doing) and R&D are naturally associated with non-convex technologies.  
Bankruptcy, too, introduces a key non-convexity, as do the constraints associated 
with information imperfections (moral hazard and adverse selection)4,5. The credit 
market imperfections (in part arising from information imperfections) in turn give 
rise to the financial accelerator, which in turn implies that the effect of a shock 
can be amplified.6  Concerns about bankruptcy can also give rise to a process of 
trend reinforcement (Battiston, et al. 2009).  For instance, a firm experiencing a 
negative shock— pushing it closer to the bankruptcy brink—will have to pay 
higher interest rates, implying that the likelihood of a further decline in net worth 
has increased.  Similarly, liquidity crises are associated with “forced” sales of 
assets, leading to price declines, adversely affecting any bank lending on the basis 
of collateral.  But the declining value of assets induces a reduction in asset-based 
lending, with consequent macroeconomic effects (Miller and Stiglitz, 
forthcoming). 
The natural models of contagion illustrate the role of non-convexities. 
Assume a proportion of the population p has a disease, and that an infected person 
communicates the disease with probability z to any non-infected person he comes 
into contact with.  Assume the degree of integration of the society is measured by 
1/g, which measures how long it takes him to “bump into” another person, chosen 
                                                
3 Information/knowledge can be viewed as a “fixed cost”—the greater the scale of production, the 
greater the saving from a cost saving idea.  Radner and Stiglitz (1984) describe a natural non-
convexity that arises in the “quantification” of information.   Starrett (1972) describes a natural 
non-convexity associated with externalities.   
4 See, for instance, Arnott and Stiglitz (1988). 
5 Credit market imperfections play a key role in the instability associated with financial market 
integration on the part of developing countries.  As we have noted, credit flows are pro-cyclical, in 
contrast with the pattern predicted by “standard” theory, which suggests that they should be 
countercyclical.   
6See also Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984), who show that information imperfections can 
give rise to equity rationing.  Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) showed how this could led to a 
financial accelerator:    If firms’ production or demand is limited by their access to capital, the 
effect of a positive shock that increases equity is amplified as, say, investment increases by a 
multiple of that amount, and then multiplied further through the usual multiplier (Bernanke and 
Gertler 1995).   There is a growing literature on how these credit and collateral constraints can 
give rise to bubbles and economic fluctuations.  See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Gellegati and 
Stiglitz (1992), and Miller and Stiglitz (forthcoming). 
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randomly from the population.  Then the spread of the diseases is given by dp/dt 
= gpz(1 – p), a logistic curve.   
In any of these circumstances, risk sharing (closer integration) can be 
welfare-decreasing.  A simple example illustrates.  Consider a case where a firm 
is near bankruptcy, so it has to pay high interest rates—higher than the mean 
return on its assets.  If there is no risk (its returns are certain), then the death of the 
firm is inevitable.  But if there is some variability in returns, then there is a chance 
that it will break out of the death trap.  There is some chance that it will have a 
very positive return that will result in interest rates falling enough that the mean 
return is now in excess of the interest rate it has to pay.   
Those concerned with designing electric networks have worried about 
analogous problems posed by connectivity.  Developing a strong integrated 
electric grid, it was believed, would have distinct benefits.  An increase in demand 
in one part of the grid could be “smoothed” with other parts of the grid.  The 
system excess capacity required to prevent a brownout or blackout from occurring 
(with greater than a particular frequency) was thereby greatly reduced; 
alternatively, for any given capacity, the probability of a brownout or blackout 
was reduced.    But a large surge in demand, or a failure in one part of the system, 
could lead to system-wide failure; in the absence of integration, the failure would 
have been geographically constrained.  The U.S. learned this lesson bitterly in 
August 2003, when a minor problem with a high-voltage power line in northern 
Ohio launched a series of failures that became the biggest blackout in North 
American history, leaving 50 million without electricity (Minkel 2008). 
Well designed networks have circuit breakers, to prevent the “contagion” 
of the failure of one part of the system to others.  Yet, advocates of unbridled 
liberalization have paid little attention to these risks; there has been virtually no 
discussion of circuit breakers, and indeed, in some quarters, such circuit 
breakers—such as the temporary imposition of capital controls—have been 
vehemently opposed.7   
This paper presents a simple analytic framework within which we can 
begin to address the question of how economic architecture—the structure of 
economic relationships—affects systemic performance.  We focus on risk sharing 
(capital flows), ignoring other channels through which shocks to one country 
might affect those with which it is interconnected.8  We structure the model to 
                                                
7 Interestingly, in the aftermath of the equity market crash of 1987, circuit breakers were imposed 
in those markets.  Following the flash crash of May 6, 2010 in America’s financial markets, these 
have been expanded, and there are ongoing proposals for further strengthening.   
8 An earlier paper (Stiglitz 2010) sets this problem within a broader context, showing more general 
conditions under which liberalization (trade and capital market integration) lowers expected utility 
as a result of increased general equilibrium risk.  It makes the point that much of our belief in the 
virtues of liberalization is based on either partial equilibrium models or on first best general 
equilibrium models. 
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give the benefit of the doubt to liberalization:  in our model, without system 
failure, liberalization is always desirable, i.e. capital flows are income-smoothing 
(in contrast to the real world, or more general theoretical models, where they 
often increase variability).  Yet we show that with a risk of system failure, it is 
possible that, in general, full integration is not desirable.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  After setting up the general framework in 
section II, we derive conditions under which liberalization is welfare-enhancing, 
showing in particular that full liberalization/integration is not optimal.  Section III 
focuses on the special problems posed by system failure. Section IV then shows 
that circuit breakers (which can be interpreted as capital controls invoked under 
certain circumstances) can be welfare-enhancing.  Section V then poses the 
question of the optimal design of networks.  Section VI explores in detail a 
particular parameterization, where there is no production enhancement from 
diversification (output is linear in inputs), but there are bankruptcy costs.   
A central message of the paper is that with non-convexities, risk 
diversification can be welfare-decreasing.  Section VII shows that such non-
convexities can arise in the long run even when they seemingly do not make their 
appearance in the short run.  Section VIII provides an intuitive interpretation of 
the results, while sections IX and X relate our results to the broader literature on 
contagion and systemic risk, especially in financial markets.  We conclude with 
some general observations about the direction of future research.   
II. A simple model without system failure 
We assume that output in country i is a function of a random variable, Si, which 
(with a shift in origin)9 can be thought of as the stock of available capital. (In 
Section X we provide a broader interpretation of our model, focusing on financial 
capital.) 
ܳ௜ ൌ ܨሺ ௜ܵሻ,      ܨᇱ ൐ 0,     ܨᇱᇱ ൑ 0
 In autarky, 
௜ܵ ൌ መܵ ൅ ߳௜
where ௜ܵ ൌ መܵ ൅ ߳௜
                                                
9 That is, we allow negative S. 
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Where ε are a set of i.i.d. shocks,  E (ε) = 0 and Var (ε) = σ2.  We 
normalize by choosing our units so that መܵ ൌ 1. This means that if there are N 
countries, expected global output is 
ܰܧܨ൫ መܵ ൅ ߳௜൯ ൎ ܰܨ൫ መܵ൯ ൅
1
2








ܾ ൌ െܨᇱᇱ൫ መܵ൯ መܵଶ/ܨሺ መܵሻ 
Average output per country is 




With liberalization, there is smoothing.  Capital flows to where there is a shortage.  
Assume that the intertemporal discount factor is unity and that there is full 
smoothing, i.e.  
ܵԢ௜ ൌ ෍ ௜ܵ /ܰ ൌ መܵ ൅ ෍ ߳௜ /ܰ
It follows that 
ܰܧܳ ൌ ܰܧܨሺ መܵ ൅ ෍ ߳௜ /ܰሻ ൐ ܰܧܨሺ መܵ ൅ ߳௜ሻ
so long as F” < 0 and  σ2 > 0.   
It is easy to calculate the benefits of liberalization. 
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i.e. the change in average output  










∆ തܳ ൌ ܨሺ መܵሻ
ܾݏଶ
2
Liberalization allows for smoothing.  With i.i.d. shocks, in the limiting 
case there is full smoothing, so that the benefit of liberalization is the expected 
loss of output from the variability of shocks across countries.  This is a simplified 
variant of the standard argument for liberalization. 
III. Liberalization with failure 
We now consider a simple model of systemic failure, which we can think of as 
System failure:  ߳௜ ൌ െ∞
With this definition, a system failure in any one country leads to a system failure 
in all countries under liberalization.  We define 
    Q = Q (S)  for S ≤ S* < 1.    
S* can be thought of as the level of S below which the country (firm) goes into 
bankruptcy.  At this point, losses are limited.  The difference between 
  and Q can be thought of as the bankruptcy costs, in the case of a 
firm, or the costs of societal disruption associated with “crisis,” in the case of a 
country.  This means, of course, that Q(S) is no longer concave, so the 
presumption that risk pooling will be welfare enhancing no longer obtains.   
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Assume that the probability of failure of any country is 1 – p, and assume 
for the moment that p is fixed.  Then in the absence of liberalization 
ܧܰܳ ൌ ݌ܰܧܨ൫ መܵ ൅ ߳௜൯ ൅ ܰሺ1 െ ݌ሻܳ ൎ ݌ܰܨ൫ መܵ൯ ቆ1 െ
ܾݏଶ
2
ቇ ൅ ܰሺ1 െ ݌ሻܳ
With full liberalization, the probability of international system failure is  
ݍሺܰሻ ൌ 1 െ ݌ே
so that expected output is 
ܰܧܨ ቀ መܵ ൅ ෍ ߳௜ /ܰቁ ݌ே ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ேሻܳܰ
Thus, liberalization is desirable if and only if 
݌ܧܨ൫ መܵ ൅ ߳௜൯ ൏ ܧܨ ቀ መܵ ൅ ෍ ߳௜ /ܰቁ ݌ே ൅ ሺ݌ െ ݌ேሻܳ
Or 
݌ேିଵ ൐
ܧܨ൫ መܵ ൅ ߳௜൯ െ ܳ
ܧܨ൫ መܵ ൅ ∑ ߳௜ /ܰ൯ െ ܳ
Without loss of generality, we can set Q = 0.10  It immediately follows that 
if p is fixed and bound away from zero, the probability of system-wide failure 
goes to one as N goes to infinity, and hence system wide output goes to the lower 
bound, zero:   liberalization is never desirable. 
In the case where p is not bound away from zero, the calculations are more 








                                                
10 In this formulation, if S* > 0, the immediate drop to zero from F(S*) > 0 can be thought of as 
the bankruptcy cost.  If S* = 0, the production function, with bankruptcy, is convex; if S* > 0, it is 
neither convex nor concave.  Later sections explore some of the complications that this introduces.   
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We focus on the case where variance is small, i.e. s2  < 2/b.11  The condition for 
liberalization being desirable can be written   










For each N, there is a critical probability of failure above which liberalization is 
undesirable.   The critical value of N, for each p, is given by the solution to 






















Even if the probability of failure goes to zero as the number of countries 
goes to infinity, liberalization may not be desirable.  Assume p = p(N) such that 
lim pN = α.12  1 - α  is the probability of system failure.  Then liberalization is 
desirable if and only if, in the limit,  
ܧܨ൫ መܵ ൅ ߳௜൯ ൏ ܧܨ ቀ መܵ ൅ ෍ ߳௜ /ܰቁ ߙ
i.e.  






This equation identifies the three critical parameters that determine 
whether liberalization is desirable:  (a) the higher the probability of failure, the 
less desirable liberalization; (b) the higher the variability, the greater the benefit 
                                                
11 In the high variance case, the above expression is always negative for large enough N, so that, 
for large enough N, liberalization is always desirable.   
12 Lim ln pN = lim N ln p = lim ln p/1/N.  If p (<1) is fixed, then the limit is minus infinity.  But if 
p goes to one, then both the numerator and the denominator go to zero.  The limit then equals  lim  
- N2 p’/p.   
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of liberalization; and (c) the higher the cost of variability, the greater the benefit 
of liberalization. 
An alternative formulation 
There is a slight modification of this formulation13 that enables a simplification of 
the calculation.  Assume the country is faced by two shocks, the relatively small 
i.i.d. ε’s described earlier and a large shock, large enough to cause systemic 
failure, a macro-shock that occurs in only one country, and it occurs in that 
country with probability Π/n, where n is the number of countries.14  As before, we 
follow the normalizations that when bankruptcy occurs, Q = 0, and S෠ =1.  For 
simplicity, in this section, we assume that the support of ε is sufficiently narrow 
that in the absence of the macroeconomic shock, the country never goes bankrupt.  
We know the utility of final consumption by U(Q) with U” < 0, i.e. there is risk 
aversion. 
Without integration,  
EUNI =   (1 – Π/N)  EU(F(1 + ε)) + (Π/N) U (0) 
With integration among N countries,  
EUN(n)= (1 – n Π/N)  EU(F(1 + Σε/n)) + (nΠ/N) U (0). 
The first term represents the benefit from risk diversification (the one 
usually discussed within the literature advocating capital market integration), the 
second is the increased risk of contagion.  As n increases, there are diminishing 
returns to diversification, while the costs of contagion—the potential loss from 
being integration with a failed economy—increases: 
d EUN(n)/dn = (1 – n Π/N) ∂ EU(F(1 +Σ ε/n))/∂n  - (Π/N)[ EU(F(1 + Σε/n)) - U (0)] 
  
                                                
13 Suggested by an anonymous referee. 
14 Similar results obtain if, as in the previous formulation, the probability of a large shock hitting 
each country is independent.  The only difference is that in this last case, as the number of 
countries that are integrated increases, the probability that at least one of them faces a macro-
economic shock increases more rapidly than in this model, so the optimal size of the risk-sharing 
“club” is smaller.   
10
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Standard arguments for risk diversification explain why EU(F(1 +Σ ε/n) 
increases as n increases.  Setting 
        d EUN(n)/dn  = 0 
there is an optimal size risk sharing club (see the discussion below in section V).  
In the limit, as the variance of ε goes so zero, as the concavity of F goes to zero 
and risk aversion goes to  zero, there are no risk benefits for sharing, and only 
contagion costs, so n* = 1.  Since the marginal benefits to risk diversification 
diminish to zero, while as n gets large, EU(F(1 + Σε/n)) - U (0) ≈ U(F(1)) – U(0) 
is a large, finite number, full integration is never desirable.   
Risk sharing ex post 
There are many ways of sharing risk, in particular, before or after production.  For 
instance, countries could provide a consumption sharing agreement without 
capital market liberalization, i.e. a capital sharing agreement.  They would then 
not be exposed to the risk of systemic failure, but enjoy the benefits of risk 
diversification.  They would lose the benefits associated with pro-production risk 
sharing due to the concavity of the production function.  Thus, a full consumption 
risk sharing agreement with no production sharing among n countries would 
generate expected utility of 
  EURn =  E U{ [(n – ψ(n) ΣF(1 + ε))]/n} 
where ψ(n) is the probability distribution of the number of countries in the “club” 
of n members that face a systemic risk.  In the simple model described earlier, 
where only one country faces a macroeconomic shock, then ψ = {1 with 
probability n/N, 0 with probability 1 – n/N} .  Because there are no contagion 
effect, optimal consumption risk sharing involves all N countries.   
We can combine production and consumption risk sharing.  The fact that 
because production and consumption risk sharing are partial substitutes, the 
benefits of production risk sharing (diversification) are reduced, while the costs of 
contagion remain essentially unabated, implies that the optimal size of production 
sharing arrangements will be smaller, and indeed, when the loss from contagion is 
high enough and the benefits of production smoothing low enough, then there will 
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IV. Circuit breakers 
Assume that we construct a system of circuit breakers (e.g. restrictions on capital 
flows).  Circuit breakers can be either simple or complex; they can, for instance, 
specify limits on capital flows from one country to another that depend only on 
the sending country, or that depend on the circumstances in both countries.  
Consider the case of two countries.  Then it is optimal to share risk so long as ΣSi 
> 2S*.  But if ΣSi < 2S*, then it is better to have only one country go bankrupt, 
rather than both, and there should be no transfer of resources from the better-off 
country to the poorer country.  (Indeed, given our assumptions, expected utility 
would be even higher if the poorer country transferred income to the richer.)  In a 
world with many countries, implementing such “complex” circuit breakers would 
be difficult.  In this section, we focus on simple circuit breakers that depend only 
on the nature of the shock experienced by each country independently.   
We thus assume that if 
߳௜ ൑ ݇
the country is quarantined. Let υ be the probability of a quarantine.  Then 
υ  = G(k), 
where G(ε) is the cumulative distribution of ε.  Then, with two countries, expected 
output per country with circuit breakers is 
തܳሺ݇ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݒሻଶܧ ൬ܨ ൬ መܵ ൅
߳௜ ൅ ௝߳
2
൰ |߳௜, ௝߳ ൒ ݇൰
൅2ݒሺ1 െ ݒሻൣܧ൫ܨሺ መܵ ൅ ߳௜|߳௜ ൒ ݇ሻ൯ ൅ ܧ൫ܨሺ መܵ ൅ ߳௜|߳௜ ൑ ݇ሻ൯൧
൅ሺݒሻଶܧ൫ܨሺ መܵ ൅ ߳௜ሻ|߳௜ ൑ ݇൯
we can find the optimal degree of liberalization, i.e. the value of k for which 
തܳሺ݇ሻis maximized. It is possible to show that under fairly weak conditions on the 
distributions G and F, the optimal value of k, i.e. the value of k which  
0 ൏ ݇כ ൏ ܭ ൏ ∞
       _
Maximizes Q (k) 
    {k} 
is finite, and less than the upper bound on εi.  That is, there are some restrictions 
on capital flows that increase welfare. 
Similar results hold for N > 2, though the notation is more complicated. 
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V. Optimal networks 
In the absence of circuit breakers, we can easily analyze the design of optimal 
connectivity.  Assume we have an infinite number of countries15 but that we can 
organize them into risk sharing clubs, each of which has N members.16  The larger 
N, the higher the probability of system failure, but the better risk sharing.  This 




ܧܨ ቀ መܵ ൅ ෍ ߳௜ /ܰቁ ݌ே ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ேሻܳ
Define N* as the solution to the above maximization problem.  If p < 1, 
then it is clear that N* < infinity. 
If 
  
ܧܨ ቀ መܵ ൅ ෍ ߳௜ /2ቁ ݌ଶ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ଶሻܳ ൒ ݌ ቂܧܨ൫ መܵ ൅ ߳௜൯ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻܳቃ
then some liberalization is desirable.    
Each of the clubs can be linked with each other through weak links, e.g.. if 
ܵҧ௞  and ܵҧ௞ᇲ represent the (average) value of S in club Sk (Sk’), then the two clubs 
smooth with each other provided |ܵҧ௞– ܵҧ௞ᇲ ’| < δ.  This imposes limits on capital 
flows, and ensures that a system failure in k (k’) does not get transmitted to a 
system failure in k’ (k).   
If we could design perfect circuit breakers, i.e. circuit breakers that would 
prevent contagion of a disaster from one country to the other, but allow risk 
sharing otherwise, it should be clear then that we should have full integration, for 
countries then could enjoy the benefits of diversification without paying the costs 
of contagion.17  Unfortunately, such perfect circuit breakers cannot really be 
designed (though in the context of the models that we have formulated here, they 
could be.)  There are a host of idiosyncratic shocks facing each country.  It may 
be difficult to isolate which risk sharing agreement “trips” the country into 
                                                
15 This is only an assumption of convenience, which allows us to treat N as a continuous variable 
and to avoid integer problems in dividing up the world into optimal clubs.    
16 There is a parallel analysis for examining connectivity among banks or firms.  We comment 
further on these alternative interpretations in section VII. 
17 This has been shown, for instance, in a variant of the model presented at the end of the previous 
section, in Zhang  (2010). 
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ߙଵ െ ሺ1 െ ݍሻߙଶ
systemic failure, and, as Section VII illustrates, even more difficult in a dynamic 
context, where a particular episode of adverse risk sharing has its most adverse 
consequences not at the moment, but in subsequent periods, as it (with other 
adverse shocks) contributes to a downward spiral.   
In this section, problems in one country lead to that in others as a result of 
contractual arrangements relating to risk sharing.  This is, of course, only one of 
several mechanisms through which a problem in one country can be transmitted to 
another, i.e. through which contagion occurs.  Later, we discuss alternative 
channels of contagion, and the implications for network design.  Moreover, in this 
section, we have focused on a simple organizational design, where countries are 
all (ex ante) identical, and where the question is, what is the optimal size of risk-
sharing clubs?  Later in the paper, we briefly discuss more general questions in 
international economic architecture. 
VI. Linear output subject to bankruptcy  
So far, we have modeled the economy as facing a trade-off between value of risk 
diversification—assuming that there is no system failure—and the likelihood of 
system failure.  Financial market integration increases diversification possibilities, 
but may also increase the risk of system failure, at least for small N.  We now 
consider a polar case where there is no value of risk diversification—production is 
linear in S, provided S is greater than some critical number S*, at which point 
system failure occurs, and a loss of –C occurs.  The main concern then is to 
minimize the losses from system failure.    
(a) Two outcome case 
Assume that Si = -α1 with probability q, α2 with probability 1 – q, such that 
 q
  
i.e. expected output without bankruptcy is zero, but if  
S ≤ 0,  
the country goes bankrupt, with output – C, where 
C < α1. 
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Hence, prior to liberalization, expected output is  
െݍܥ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݍሻߙଶ ൌ ݍሺߙଵ െ ܥሻ
Assume N = 2, and there is full liberalization.  Then, there are two cases: 
  α2 > α1,  
i.e. q > .5;  and 
  α2 <  α1,  
i.e. q  < .5. 
We focus on the latter case—small probabilities of “disaster.”  Then with 
liberalization,  
ݍ ቀ෍ ௜ܵ/2 ൏ 0ቁ ൌ 1 െ ሺ1 െ ݍሻଶ
i.e. both countries go bankrupt if only one country has a bad outcome, and 
expected output (per country) is 
ሺ1 െ ݍሻଶߙଶ െ ܥሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ݍሻଶሻ ൏ െݍܥ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݍሻߙଶ
Liberalization is unambiguously welfare decreasing.  A slightly ”tighter” 
threshold for bankruptcy gives more ambiguous results. Assume bankruptcy 
occurs if  
ΣSi/2 ≤ K < 0.  Then if 
ߙଵ െ ߙଶ ൐ 2ܭ
liberalization is welfare decreasing.  In the other case, expected output is 
െݍଶሺܥ െ ߙଵሻ ൐ ݍሺߙଵ െ ܥሻ
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There thus exists a critical value of q such that if disaster occurs rarely but 
seriously liberalization is welfare reducing.  The critical q* is defined by 
ݍכ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߫ሻሺ1 െ 2߫ሻ
where 
߫ ؠ 2ܭ/ߙଵ
If ς ≥ 1, then liberalization is always desirable.  If ς = 0 (K = 0)—the case 
discussed earlier—it is never desirable.   
More generally, if there are N countries, there is a critical q* for each N 
and K such that if q < q*(N,K) liberalization is not desirable.  So long as the 
probability of an individual country facing failure is greater than q*, liberalization 
lowers expected output.   
The probability of all countries going into bankruptcy in a club of size N 
can be calculated in a straightforward manner.  Define n* = Integer {α1/ α2), i.e. 
the smallest integer less than α1/ α2.   Assume that n countries have a bad outcome, 
N – n a good outcome.  Then, so long as n ≥ n* all countries go into bankruptcy.  
The probability of this can be derived from the binomial distribution.  The 
probability that n > n*, P*(n > n*) is given by 
ܲכሺ݊ ൐ ݊כሻ ൌ ෍ ቀܰ
݅
ቁ ݍ௜ሺ1 െ ݍሻேି௜
ே
௜ୀ௡כାଵ
It is obvious, using the law of large numbers, that if K = 0, as N goes to 
infinity, liberalization is never desirable. 
(b) Case of multiple outcomes 
Assume that  
Si = {- α with probability q, + α with probability q, and 0 with probability 1 – 2q}. 
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We assume output in a country just equals S, in the absence of bankruptcy.  
Assume that, in a system of (full) risk sharing among N countries, system failure 
occurs when ΣSi ≤ 0 , or equivalently, the average value of S in the system is 
negative, i.e. 
ΣSi /N ≤ 0.   
If C = 0 (zero bankruptcy cost), then output  
 
ܳ ൌ ቄ ܵ for ܵ ൐ 0
െܥ for ܵ ൑ 0
  
is a convex function, so that risk sharing should be welfare reducing.  If, however,  
C > 0, there is a strictly positive bankruptcy cost, then the “production” function 
is “S” shaped, being neither convex nor concave, so the welfare impacts of 
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Consider, for example, the case of N = 2.  Then without integration, expected 
output per country is   q(α  - C), 
There are six possible outcomes, given in Table 1.  (For the moment, 
ignore the next to last column.)   
Table 1 




- α - α - C, -C - C - C 
- α 0 - C,  -C - C - C 
- α α - C, α (α – C)/ 2 -C 
0 0 -C, - C -C -C 
0 α -C, α (α - C)/2 α/2 
α α α, α α α 
No integration without risk sharing does better than integration in the case 
of {- α , α}, and worse in the case of {0, α}.  The first occurs with a probability of 
2p2, thee second with a probability of 2q(1-2q), so that integration is welfare 
enhancing if 
   2q2 {-2C – (α – C)} +2q(1-2q){α – [α – C]} > 0, 
which implies that  
q  < C/ α + 3C. 
Integration is only desirable if q is sufficiently small.  If C = 0, integration is 
never desirable, as expected.   
If individuals are risk averse, so that the value associated with output Q is 
a concave function of Q, then integration is even less desirable than this 
calculation suggests, , since output is decreased (on average) in a state of nature 
that is worse (the state {-α, α} is worse than the state {0, α}.  
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With N countries and full integration, system-wide failure will occur if 
(1/N)ΣSi  ≤  0. As N increases, by the law of large numbers, the average value of 
S converges to zero, and, at least half of the time, Σ S  ≤ 0, so  
expected output ≤ -.5C. That is less than the output with no integration q(α – C) 
provided only that 
q < .5 
which will always be the case, provided that there is some probability of the zero 
outcome.  Full integration again never pays if there are enough countries. 
Note that this approach may overstate the gains from full economic 
integration.  If countries are risk averse, they can still share risks after production, 
even if they are not fully integrated.   
But a slight modification of the model shows how sensitive the results are 
to the specification of the bankruptcy conditions.  Assume that bankruptcy occurs 
when S < 0 (rather than S ≤ 0).  Then the outcomes chart is changed to  
Table 2 




- α -α - C, -C - C - C 
- α 0 - C, 0 - C/2 - C 
-α α - C, α (α – C)/ 2 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 α 0, α α/2 α/2 
α α α α α 
No integration does better when the outcomes are {-α, 0} (integration 
brings both into bankruptcy), while no integration does worse when outcomes are 
{α, - α}, for then integration avoids bankruptcy.  Expected output with no 
integration is higher if  
           (1 – 2q)q [ C/2]  +  q2 (α – C)/2 = ½ q {C – q(3C – α)} > 0 . 
Again, as expected, if C = 0, so the pay-off function is convex, this condition is 
always satisfied:  if there are no bankruptcy costs, integration is never desirable.  
If there are bankruptcy costs (C > 0), then integration is not desirable if C is low 
enough 
19
Stiglitz: Contagion, Liberalization and Globalization
Brought to you by | Columbia University Law Library New York (Columbia University Law Library New York)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 6/18/12 8:19 PM
(i)   C < α, 
Or, 
(ii)   if C > α, if the probability of the extreme events ( +α, -α) is low 
enough, i.e.   
  q  ≤   C/(3C - α) ≡ q * 
A sufficient condition is that q is less than 1/3 . 
With risk aversion, now integration is more desirable than these 
calculations suggest, because integration does worse than no-integration in the 
case of {- α , 0} and, if it does better, it is in the case of {α, - α }.  With risk 
sharing, again, the benefits of integration are reduced, with everyone being better 
off in every state of nature with no-integration if C < α; with expected utility 
being higher, if q ≤ q*. 
More generally, no integration with risk sharing is thus preferable to 
integration if U(Q) is the (concave) utility function, if 
(1-2q)[U(-C/2)  - U(- C)) > q [U(0))- U((α – C)/2)]  
With risk aversion, even if expected output is lower, expected utility can 
be higher (since integration performs better in a state of nature that is worse).  The 
greater the degree of risk aversion, the higher the critical level of q.  
The central insight of this section is that with bankruptcy costs, output is 
neither a convex nor concave function of S, so that whether integration is welfare 
increase or decreasing is ambiguous, and depends on the size of the bankruptcy 
costs, the probabilities of extreme events, and the degree of risk aversion.  We 
have shown how in a simple example, one can identify precise values of the 
relevant parameters under which integration is and is not desirable.  We have 
identified circumstances in which no integration is desirable, and provided more 
general condition under which full integration is not desirable.  Risk mitigation 
does not, moreover, require integration: consumption risks can be shared, even in 
the absence of full capital market integration.   
VII. A dynamic model 
Even if risk sharing doesn’t initially lead to a higher probability of bankruptcy, it 
can increase the probability of being near bankruptcy, and countries near 
bankruptcy may perform more poorly—engage in riskier behavior with lower 
expected returns—so that in the longer run output is lower.  But even if they don’t 
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engage in riskier behavior, they are likely to have to pay higher interest rates, so 
that the likelihood that they face bankruptcy is enhanced.   
This can be illustrated by a two period version of the model of the 
previous section.  Assume that the critical value of S such that countries go into 
default is S* < 0, so that, if N is large, with full integration, there is no bankruptcy 
the first period. To highlight the contrast between short run and long run results, 
we assume that bankruptcy costs are high, i.e. C > α.   Expected output with full 
integration in the first period is zero, greater than the output with no integration, 
which is p(α – C) < 0.  In the short run, it appears that integration is beneficial.   
For simplicity, we assume that none of this output is consumed, but is 
passed on to the next period.18  But now assume that in the second period, output 
is a random variable that depends on the value of S the firm inherits from first 
period, SH, plus the amount of capital that it has available from the second period 
(itself affected by the extent of integration, i.e. in our formulation, risk sharing).  
We simplify by writing.   
Q2 = S2 +  γ(SH) 
where  S2, as before, is a random variable  
S2 = { -α with probability q, α with probability q, and 0 otherwise} 
and  
γ = {- α – ℓ with probability q, α - ℓ with probability q, and 0 otherwise} if 
SH ≤ S’ 
   
γ  = { -α with probability q, α with probability q, and 0 otherwise} if   
  SH > S’,  
where S’ > S*, the bankruptcy level.   
If the country inherits from the first period an amount below the critical 
threshold S’, it will do more poor the second.  For instance, a country (firm) with 
a low S may face higher interest costs.  Others may be more reluctant to do 
business with a country (firm) that is more likely to be facing problems.   
This stochastic process exhibits “trend reinforcement” (Battiston et al.
2009).  (There are other reasons that economies may exhibit this property.  In 
                                                
18 The results are unaffected if there is a simple (perhaps optimal) relationship between first period 
capital and consumption, which would determine the amount of capital available at the beginning 
of the second period.   
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Arrow’s “Learning by Doing” model (1962), countries that produce or invest 
more learn more; so that successful countries have (in later periods) a more 
productive technology.  This effect is reinforced if there is “learning by learning” 
(Stiglitz, 1987).  Countries (like Ireland today) that have been hit by a large 
negative shock have a difficult time recruiting investors and business relations, 
because of the knowledge that taxes are likely to be higher and public services 
(including those valued by businesses) are likely to be lower.  (The same 
phenomenon is exhibited at the firm level, and was evidenced in the East Asia 
crisis: firms that were believed to have a higher probability of bankruptcy had a 
harder time getting contracts, because buyers viewed such supplies as less 
reliable.) 
We evaluate system performance by looking at expected final output (Q2 ) 
minus bankruptcy costs associated with first period terminations.  With no 
integration, expected losses the first period from bankruptcy are –qC (assuming 
that – α < S*, i.e. those with bad outcomes go bankrupt).  Expected output (the 
second period) from those who survive is  q(α – C) , so total expected output 
without integration, QNI is given by 
QNI =   –qC + (1-q)q(α – C)   
With full integration and a large number of countries (firms), all survive 
the first period.  But now, expected output in the second period (with probability 
approaching 1 as N approaches infinity) is –qℓ.  If  -ℓ < S*, it implies that as N 
approaches infinity, the probability of systemic crisis approaches 1, so  
QI = - C. 
where QI is output with integration.   
 QI < Q NI 
 if 
- C  <    –qC + (1-q)q(α – C) 
Or 
0 <  (1- q)(C + q (α – C)) = (1 –q)((1 – q)C + qα) 
i.e. always.  In this model, in the long run, it never pays to integrate, even though 
in the short run it appears that integration is desirable. 
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On the other hand, if -ℓ > S*, then with full integration, expected output is 
-ℓ.  Now QI < Q NI if  
        
 -ℓ < –qC + (1-q)q(α – C)  = q [(1-q)α – (2-q)C], 
i.e. if 
  
             ℓ > q [ (2-q)C - (1-q)α], 
The benefits of integration are that it avoids the bankruptcy cost, but if bankruptcy 
costs are low enough, then integration is never desirable.  All that is required is 
that 
      C  <  [ℓ /q + (1-q)α]/2 –q 
If C ≈ α, then the condition is satisfied if C < ℓ /q. 
VIII. Intuitive interpretation 
There is a natural intuition behind our results.  In the models presented here, 
output as a function of C is neither concave nor convex.  Even if liberalization, by 
averaging, represents a mean preserving reduction in risk in the Rothschild-
Stiglitz sense, it may increase the probability that S falls below a critical 
threshold, and it is this that trips the switch.  Intuitively, economists who argued 
for liberalization made strong behavioral assumptions (that financial flows would 
be countercyclical, rather than pro-cyclical), which have been shown to be false.  
Theories of imperfect information and incomplete risk markets have helped 
explain why that may be the case.  This paper has raised, however, another 
concern:  that they also made strong structural assumptions, e.g. about concavity 
of all the relevant functions.  With bankruptcy, externalities, financial market 
accelerator, R & D, learning, etc. we know that that is not the case.     
In our simple model, risk sharing and gambling arrangements simply 
move capital around, in what might seem to be nothing more than zero-sum 
transactions.  Conventional economics has emphasized that well designed risk 
sharing arrangements, however, constitute a “positive-sum” game; and with 
convex preferences and production sets that is the case.19  By contrast, when there 
are non-convexities such as those associated with bankruptcy, risk sharing may 
convert a zero-sum game into a negative-sum game.  Whether greater 
interconnectivity is net positive or negative thus depends on whether the first set 
                                                
19 Elsewhere (Stiglitz 1982) I have argued that much of the exchange of risks that occur in equity 
markets cannot be viewed as exchanges among rational individuals that are designed to increase 
their expected utility. 
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of effects, the diversification benefits, outweighs the second, the contagion costs.  
That depends both on the degree of risk aversion, the concavity of production 
functions (the extent to which they exhibit diminishing returns), the costs of 
bankruptcy, and the impact of sharing on the probability of bankruptcy.   
This paper has developed concrete models in which we can weigh the 
diversification benefits against contagion costs, which we model, for simplicity, 
as arising from bankruptcy.  Risk sharing transforms the probability distribution 
in complex ways that may increase or decrease the probability of bankruptcy, as 
we have seen.  This depends in part on the bankruptcy threshold.  Thus, in the 
model with two countries, with three outcomes, with symmetric gains and losses, 
in which risk sharing reduces the probability of a large loss (-α).  But it also 
increases the probability of some loss, and it can therefore increase the probability 
of both countries facing collapse.  How risk sharing affects the probability of 
systemic collapse is thus a complex matter.  Indeed, in another version of the 
model, with a large number of countries, full risk sharing can result in an almost 
zero probability of bankruptcy or a high probability of bankruptcy, depending on 
the relationship between the bankruptcy threshold and the limit value of the 
average. 
This discussion should make clear some of the key qualitative 
determinants of the optimal degree of integration.  The greater the concavity of 
the production function outside of bankruptcy, the greater the benefit of risk 
sharing; the greater the bankruptcy costs and the larger the risk of large negative 
shock, the greater the potential losses from “risk sharing.”  These intuitions have 
been confirmed by a large number of simulations, which suggest, even with 
simple probability distributions, complex patterns of interactions, with average 
output not even being a single peaked function of the size of the sharing “club.”   
(One aspect of the analysis is discomforting: the argument against risk 
sharing in “extreme” situations is that the stricken country is so badly off that the 
benefits to it (at the margin) of an extra dollar are, at least for the moment, less 
than that to others.20) 
In dynamic models, complex interactions associated with integration may 
make outcomes with integration worse.  The model of the previous section 
highlights one effect, which Battiston et al. (2009) refer to as the Trend 
Reinforcement Effect:  as countries get near default, there is an increased 
probability of moving toward default.  Hence, even if countries have a lower 
probability in the short run of default, because of income smoothing, there may be 
a higher probability of poor outcomes, leading to a higher risk of default in the 
longer run.   
                                                
20 As the aphorism puts it: putting good money after bad. 
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A further set of negative externalities associated with “trend 
reinforcement” arises from more complex interactions associated with bankruptcy 
cascades and price effects generated by default.  The bankruptcy of one country 
heightens the subsequent probability of bankruptcy of those with which it 
interacts  (Greenwald and Stiglitz 2003; Allen and Gale 2001; Battiston et al.
2007).  Because trading partners know this, they may insist on higher interest 
rates, further increasing the risk of default in subsequent periods. 
There are other instances in which it has become commonly accepted that 
risk diversification is not optimal:  after a banking crisis, it is common to argue 
for stripping out the bad assets, and forming a good bank and a bad bank.  There 
are two arguments for such “unmixing,” both based on non-convexities. One is 
the benefits of specialization in management, with one bank focusing on 
disposing of the bad assets, and the other in making new loans and managing 
good assets.  The other heuristically sees lending as a diminishing function of risk 
(say as measured by the coefficient of variation), with lending reaching zero, say, 
at a particular critical level of risk.  If that level of risk has been attained, stripping 
out the good (low variance) assets creates an institution that is willing and able to 
lend.  There is no loss in lending from the other part—since lending in any case 
was zero.  (The argument is particularly compelling when there are macro-
economic externalities associated with lending.)21 
There are many other bases of contagion, consistent both with the 
metaphor of contagion and the mathematics of non-convexities, with 
accompanying results that also suggest that the benefits of integration need to be 
balanced with costs. The origin of the word is associated with the spread of a 
disease, and the standard mathematic model shows the value of quarantining.  If 
there are two isolated populations (say of equal size) with a proportion pi of the ith
population diseased, then the increase in numbers with the disease is proportional 
to 
∑ pi (1 – pi), 
but if the two populations are mixed together, the increase is proportional to 
2p* (1 – p*) 
where p* = ½ (p1 + p2). 
It is easy to show that 
                                                
21 For a more complete analysis of the relationship between bank portfolios and their lending 
decisions, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003). 
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∑ pi (1 – pi)  <      2p* (1 – p*) 
so long as p1 does not equal p2, i.e. quarantines slow the pace of the diffusion of 
the disease.   
Standard analysis (pre-crisis) focused on “conservative” systems, where a 
fixed shock was subject to division through diversification/risk sharing, thereby 
diminishing the adverse impact.  But with contagion, there can be amplification; 
one diseased person can transmit the disease to many others.  The system is not, 
in this sense, conservative.  In one way or another, models of contagion entail 
some form of amplification, where the total impact can be increased with an 
increase in connectivity.   
There are many channels through which connectivity and amplification 
are linked.  For instance, market participants are risk averse.  Assume that country 
A has a serious problem,  and country A is linked (directly and indirectly) with a 
series of other countries.  Market participants then know that there is a risk of a 
problem in any country with which there is connectivity—and if there is a risk of 
amplification, then the greater the extent of connectivity, the greater the systemic 
risk (the essential point of this paper.) 
Assume, for instance, that country A has a loss of L, and that is has 
contracts that share that loss with n other countries ΣLi = L, .   Assume, for 
simplicity, the cost to each is linear in Li, the loss it absorbs, provided Li < L*, but 
is C  for Li > L*, where we assume C is large, and > L.  If the risk is shared 
evenly, then for large L, the total loss is nC > L for L/n > L*, i.e. for n < L/L* ≡
n* , and L* for n > L/L*.  Thus, as figure 2 illustrates, societal loss increases as n 
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Figure 2 
L ൌ െ݊ܥ for ݊ ൏ ݊
כ
ܮכ for ݊ ൐ ݊כ
With L and L* known, the optimal degree of diversification is clear:  we 
set n > n* if n* < N, the total number of countries, and equal to 0 otherwise.  We 
either diversify the risk so much that it presents no problem for any country, or we 
“quarantine” the risk in the country of origin.  Assume now that L is a random 
variable.  Figure 3 shows the trade-offs.  It plots total loss as a function of L, for 
fixed n (degree of diversification) so long as L is small enough, diversification 
pays.  But if L is large, there are large losses from the contagion.  If n is increased 
(a higher degree of diversification), diversification can handle a larger L.  But 
when L is large, total societal costs are increased.  There is an optimal degree of 
diversification.22 
  
                                                
22 The analysis is parallel if there is uncertainty about the capacity of each country to absorb risk 
before confronting bankruptcy, i.e. over the value of L* 
L 
L nC 
  n*   n
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But now assume that there is risk about how the loss is divided.  Assume, 
for instance, it is known that the risk is divided among n countries, n < n*, but 
there is a lack of transparency, so it is not known which countries.  Hence, each 
country now faces a risk of a loss of –C with probability n/N, where N is the total 
number of countries.  The market value of each will be decreased by  nC/N, and 
each will find it more difficult to raise capital.  As Section VI illustrated, this in 
turn will have its own amplification effect; uncertainty can amplify the 
amplifications.   
IX. Some broader perspectives on contagion and circuit breakers:  
Macroeconomics 
The analysis of this paper constitutes only part of a broader investigation into the 
economics of contagion, which asks how problems in one country can spread, 
having adverse effects on others.  Much of the policy debate has focused on 
responses to crises—how to prevent “contagion” once a crisis has occurred.  A 
central message of this paper is that if there is a possibility of contagion, one 
needs to incorporate that into the analysis of policies and structures before a crisis 
occurs.  While there has been some recognition of the need to take actions (e.g. 
L 
n1L*    n2L* L 
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policies) that reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of a crisis,23 we have 
emphasized the need to design policies and structures that are sensitive to 
contagion itself.  Capital and financial market liberalization, for instance, exhibit 
the two-sided nature of risk sharing upon which we have focused: they may 
enable risk smoothing, but they may also result in problems in one country 
leading to problems in others.   
But the word contagion is used in the context of a sick country only as a 
metaphor, and the question is, what are the specific channels through which a sick 
country might infect others?  This paper has explored one important set of 
channels, through risk sharing contracts.  While to give our model concreteness, 
we have presented the model as if it involved physical capital, a better 
interpretation entails financial capital,  payments from healthy countries (firms, 
banks) to sick countries (firms, banks), leading to problems in the healthy 
countries.24   
There are three other widely discussed channels.  The first is trade.  A 
weak economy buys less from the strong economy, and thus weakens it.  (This 
channel was important during the recent crisis in the transmission of the financial 
crisis in the developed countries to the developing countries.)   But quarantining 
exacerbates the problem.  Indeed, ex ante, there is an argument for export 
diversification, and because of macro-economic externalities, societal benefits 
from such diversification exceed private benefits, so governments might wish to 
encourage it. 
A second is through expectations.  At least since Keynes, the role of 
expectations and “animal spirits” has been emphasized.  An economic downturn 
in one country might rationally bring fears about the prospects of others who are 
linked to it through trade or finance, or at least raise new uncertainties, but even if 
the responses may be greater than can be accounted for by rational expectations, 
the economic consequences are no less real.   
(Though I couch the linkages in terms of adverse shocks, analogous 
impacts arise in the presence of positive shocks:  a wave of optimism can spread, 
inducing both lenders and borrowers to undertake high levels of lending and 
borrowing, with untoward consequences when the animal spirits become tamer.25)  
                                                
23 See, for instance, Orszag and Stiglitz (2002). 
24 While the unit of analysis of the models presented in this paper is countries, most risk sharing 
contracts are between firms (including banks) within countries.  In effect, this paper looks at the 
macroeconomic consequences of those risk sharing arrangements, no matter how they arise.  In the 
next section, we discuss the consequences of connectivity among firms (banks), ignoring the 
underlying macroeconomic structures.  The analysis is best viewed in the context of relationships 
among institutions within a country.  Future research will attempt to link more formally these two 
strands of work.   
25There is a large literature on contagion through one or more of these (or other) channels, both 
within the literature in financial economics and international economics.  See, for 
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The expectations argument seems to have played a major role in 
motivating some of the IMF bailouts in earlier decades, but much of the analysis 
was suspect (Stiglitz 1998).  Indeed, if Mexico’s economy stabilized because of 
an IMF bailout, and if it appears that Argentine would not be bailed out, then the 
Mexican bailout arguably should have exacerbated Argentina’s conditions, as 
investors realized the hopelessness of its situation.  Moreover, the interventions 
were typically described as temporary.  If markets were rational, why would they 
believe that a temporary intervention, say, in Thailand, to bolster its exchange rate 
today would have long run effects?  If the demand curves for its currency (its 
products, investments in the country) have shifted down in a way to lead to a large 
change in exchange rate, why would a temporary upward shift in the demand 
curve, supported by bailout funds, have long run permanent effects in that 
country, let alone change longer term expectations about economic conditions in 
other countries, or the equilibrium exchange rate?26   
Part of the answer for why such interventions could have real effects is not 
just expectations; there can be real consequences to an even temporary large 
change in the exchange rate.  If firms have borrowed in foreign exchange, their 
balance sheet will have changed adversely.  They may have difficulty servicing 
their debt.  Domestic banks that have lent to them in local currency may demand 
more collateral or a higher interest rate.  Bank regulators, worrying about the risks 
confronting banks, may be more stringent in their supervision.   
Worse still, other market participants will be uncertain about the balance 
sheets of firms, households, and banks.  And they will respond to this uncertainty 
with changing terms of contracts in adverse ways (e.g. charging higher interest 
rates on trade credit or demanding more collateral on loans).  It is this uncertainty 
that acts much like a contagious disease; is not subject to “zero sum” properties.  
Uncertainty about the future exchange rate between country A and B will 
adversely affect both A and B.  And it is here that structure matters:  if A and B 
are closely integrated, a shock to A will result in uncertainty about B’s economy.   
                                                                                                                                    
instance, Banerjee (1992); Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, (1999), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and 
Welch (1992); Brunnermeier (2009); Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009); Enders, Kolman and 
Müller (2010); Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010); Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003); Kiyotaki and 
Moore (2002); Suarez (1994); and the references cited in those papers.  Kodres and Pritsker (2002) 
present a rational expectations model of financial contagion in which portfolio rebalancing 
transmits idiosyncratic shocks across markets.  Calvo and Mendoza (2000) present a model in 
which globalization may increase financial contagion by decreasing investors’ incentives to gather 
market-specific information.  See the discussion in the next section.   
26 The one set of arguments relates to liquidity and the existence of multiple equilibria.  There is a 
large literature explaining why there may be multiple equilibrium, with sudden changes from one 
to another.  (Greenwald and Stiglitz 2003 provide illustrations in models with bankruptcy.  Hoff 
and Stiglitz (2001) and Shin (2000) provide more general discussions in the context of 
development and macroeconomics. In Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model of bank runs, 
government guarantees can prevent the “bad equilibrium” from occurring.    
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Some of the “advances” in financial markets have exacerbated these 
problems.  Companies can take out multi-billion dollar foreign exchange swaps, 
so large that their settlement can have macroeconomic effects.  But there is no 
transparency to these over-the-counter products, no transparency to the 
counterparties, no ability, accordingly, for the market to assess the risks.  
Correlated behavior associated with herding further opens up the possibility of 
high volatility in certain asset prices, exacerbating the risk of sudden changes in 
balance sheets, with macroeconomic consequences.27   
Restrictions on integration may reduce these risks, and thereby increase 
systemic stability.  We have emphasized in this paper that one must balance out 
the benefits of integration with these costs.  Moreover, the consequences of 
“contagion” are linked with the magnitude of amplification effects, and these in 
turn can be affected by policy, e.g. banking regulation, to which we turn in the 
next section.   
X. Some broader perspectives on contagion and circuit breakers:  
Financial markets and general equilibrium theory 
The central insight of modern welfare economics is that when information is 
imperfect and asymmetric and risk markets incomplete, markets are not in general 
constrained Pareto efficient.  Decisions made by individuals and firms e.g. with 
respect to risk sharing and risk taking may be privately profitable but lead to 
adverse systemic performance, increasing systemic risk.  This is true even with 
rational expectations.28   
(The discrepancy between social and private returns not only explains the 
inefficiency of markets, but also why certain ‘financial innovations” may have led 
to more systemic instability and poorer overall performance.) 
Each individual, for instance, may take the price distribution of housing 
(or the extent of liquidity in the market) as given, but their collective decisions 
                                                
27 Herding behavior can even occur in the context of rational expectations. Incentive structures 
based implicitly or explicitly on relative performance can also induce correlated behavior.  See 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).  See also Banerjee (1992) 
28 Newbery and Stiglitz (1982) showed how rational responses to exogenously determined risk 
(e.g. associated with variable agriculture output related to weather) lead to inefficient outcomes, 
even with rational expectations.  This result was generalized by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) 
who showed that the actions of market participants gave rise to pecuniary externalities, which, in 
the presence of imperfect risk markets and incomplete information, mattered, i.e. markets were 
never constrained Pareto efficient.  In traditional welfare economics, small price changes did not 
matter—they were essentially redistributive, with the benefits of those who gained from say 
higher prices offset by the buyers who lost.  But when there are incentive compatibility and self-
selection constraints, price changes affect how those constraints bind, and have a first order effect.  
See Arnott, Greenwald, and Stiglitz (1994).   
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affect those prices (or the extent of liquidity).  Together, their actions may lead to 
a bubble and a housing crash; each rationally believes that these events are not 
caused by its own actions.  But this volatility is man-made; it is not just the result 
of exogenous shocks, like those induced by the weather. 
For the past fifteen years, the analysis of financial systems (and 
macroeconomic systems more generally) has proceeded along two different 
courses.29 One has assumed that there are exogenous shocks, and described how 
the system responds to those shocks.  This view has predominated in policy 
making circles, and led to the Basle II standards, in which each bank assessed its 
ability to withstand the kinds of volatility that had been experienced in the past.30  
Even from the onset, critics warned not just of the technical flaws and the reliance 
on credit rating agencies, whose credibility (and incentives) had been questioned 
in the context of earlier crises (Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz 1999), but of the underlying 
assumption of exogenous risks  (Danielsson et al. 2001).   
The other view stressed not only that risk itself was endogenous, but also 
that markets are not in general (Pareto) efficient,  either in their decisions about 
risk taking, including their arrangements about risk sharing, the information that 
they gather to help manage risk, and the transparency with which they function.31 
Most of the analysis of this paper describes how economic arrangements 
affect how the economic system responds to exogenous risks, e.g. by amplifying 
the consequences, so that the risk faced by any unit (e.g. a bank or a country) is 
largely endogenous to the system.  But risk can be totally endogenous, i.e. there is 
no intrinsic source of shocks, but rather, the system creates the noise with which it 
then must cope.  This is true of many of macroeconomic shocks, from the tulip 
bulb mania to the housing bubble of recent years.32   
Thus, a full analysis of system risk and contagion must address (i) 
equilibrium contractual arrangements, and how they transmit risk from one unit to 
another; (ii) incentives for disclosure (or secrecy) and gathering information, 
which affects how the system exposes itself to and responds to risk; (iii) the 
                                                
29 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting that I emphasize these distinctions.   
30 Many of those who held these views did not change their perspectives after the crisis.  They 
believed that the financial markets had just been swept by a once-in-a-hundred year flood that was 
not of their own making.   
31 There are complex interactions among these, some of which we note below.  As systems of 
managing risk improve, market participants may undertake more risky activities (as noted by 
Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss, 1984).  Individuals may gather less information.  The net effect of 
these changes is that systemic risk performance may improve much less.  Indeed, as the current 
crisis suggests, it may even worsen.   
32 Sunspot equilibria are also of this sort.  For an example in the context of financial markets, 
where markets can oscillate between high interest regimes, with high default probabilities, to low 
interest regimes, with low default rates, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003).  In some contexts, the 
only market equilibria entail market-created noise.  See, for instance, Stiglitz (forthcoming). 
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sources of amplification, because, as we have suggested, without amplification, 
risk sharing would disperse risk and reduce its consequences.  A complete 
analysis is beyond the scope of this short paper, but in the following paragraphs, 
we call attention to several key aspects.   
Amplification 
Amplifications are important not only because of the role they play in contagion, 
but also because they can imply large consequences from small shocks.   
Earlier, we discussed the channels through which a problem in one 
country can be transmitted to another.  There is a parallel set of channels within 
the financial sector, with some more prone to amplification than others.  Among 
the channels are:  (a) risk sharing contracts, so that a loss by one financial unit is 
shifted (shared) with others; (b) contagion through price effects, as firms faced by 
an adverse shock attempt to sell their assets; asset price changes affect both 
balance sheets and credit constraints; (c) indirect effects through the real sector, 
e.g. as problems in the financial sector dampen real economic activity, with 
adverse effects even on banks that had done a good job in credit assessment;  (d) 
indirect effects as a result of financial market imperfections, as financial 
institutions that are, in one way or another, affected by a shock are forced to 
adjust their lending and investments; and (e) impacts through expectations, as the 
crisis in one country forces Bayesian investors (and even more so, those forming 
expectations in less rational ways) to adjust beliefs.  Recent crises illustrate each 
of these channels.  The breaking of the housing bubble in the United States led 
those in other countries with bubbles to reassess the likelihood that they too had a 
bubble—especially as it totally undermined the belief that markets were rational 
and that therefore there could be no bubbles.  In 1998, the Russian crisis provided 
no insights into what was occurring in Brazil; but there were a few key firms 
investing in both Brazil and Russia, and losses in Russia forced quick sales of 
Brazilian assets.  In this crisis, while the financial sector played a central role in 
the economic downturn in developed countries, many developing countries, with 
well regulated financial sectors, nonetheless subsequently faced problems in the 
financial sector as the collapse of trade weakened the real sector.33   
Ironically, such risk sharing contracts were supposed to enhance the 
ability of the economy to withstand risk.  It is clear that in the recent crisis, such 
contracts (not just the ill-fated asset backed securities, but also derivatives, 
including credit default swaps) played a central role in the creation of the crisis.  
One of the central objectives of this paper has been to explain why that might 
have been the case, by questioning the underlying mathematical structures that 
                                                
33 Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003) provide evidence of the role that this channel played in the 
context of regional shocks, e.g. associated with the decline in oil prices in the 1980s.  
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had been assumed by those arguing that such contractual arrangements 
necessarily enhanced economic stability.  But beyond that, it is important to 
understand the specific economic mechanisms through which amplification 
occurs.34     
Credit constraints (themselves related to imperfect information) can easily 
give rise to amplification.  The financial accelerator (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
1993) implies that a change in a firm’s net worth can give rise to a multiple 
increase in its demand for investment or its ability to produce.35   
More generally, small change in prices can have first order effects on 
welfare (and behavior).  This is a corollary of the Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) 
theorem.  Economies with incomplete risk markets and imperfect information in 
this respect, from the standard model, for which it can be shown that small price 
perturbations have second order effects on welfare (a result that is a 
straightforward application of the envelope theorem).  Thus, it is not the case that 
a shock that increases, say, foreign exchange rates is purely redistributive, with 
the benefits of those who lose offset by those who gain.   
Market failure 
The failure of the price system to work in the way that it is supposed to is 
particularly evident when there is a risk of bankruptcy.  Modern capitalism 
requires limited liability (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1992), but at the same time, 
with bankruptcy, private and social incentives are never perfectly aligned.  
Increased risk taking may, for instance, reduce the value of outstanding bonds, 
and bond covenants designed to prevent such actions are inevitably incomplete.  
Changes in bankruptcy probabilities also have effects on the firms’ suppliers and 
customers, externalities to which firms are unlikely to pay adequate attention.36 
The failure of markets arises not just because one could not rely on banks 
to manage their own risks in their own interests, but that because of pervasive 
externalities, even if it they did so, the decisions they made were not necessarily 
in the best interests of society.  This would be so even without the (implicit or 
explicit) government safety net, but the misalignment between private and social 
                                                
34 Key insights are provided by Korinek (2010).   
35 Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that the dynamic interaction between credit limits and asset 
prices turns out to be a powerful transmission mechanism by which the effects of small shocks 
persist, amplify, and spill over to other sectors.   See also Miller and Stiglitz (forthcoming.)   Bank 
runs represent an example of a sudden change in the state of the economy (Diamond and Dybvig 
1983).  A run on one bank can, under some economic structures, give rise to bankruptcy cascades.  
(Allen and Gale 2001, Greenwald and Stiglitz 2003). 
36 In traditional economic theory (including finance theory) bankruptcy played no role.  In my 
1969 paper on the Modigliani-Miller theorem, I first argued that bankruptcy played a critical role 
in the analysis of equilibrium, an idea on which I subsequently elaborated in Stiglitz (1972).   
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incentives is obviously particularly severe with too-big-to fail institutions and in 
the presence of deposit insurance.   
The problems with the market are deep, and as I have said, would arise 
even in the absence of government intervention.  Markets are rife with agency 
problems and (with imperfect information and risk markets) externalities, so 
private and social returns are often misaligned.  As a result of by now well known 
problems in corporate governance, firms in the financial sector provide incentives 
for their decision makers to undertake excessive risk and to be short sighted—
with results that were predictable, and not in general consistent with the interests 
of shareholders and bondholders, let alone the rest of society (Stiglitz, 1985).   
Agency problems are, of course, pervasive in a modern market economy.  
But market participants sometimes respond in ways which increase their 
magnitude, e.g. to give managers more control, so they act more in their own 
interests, less in that of other stakeholders, including shareholders (Edlin and 
Stiglitz 1995).   They can do so, for instance, by acting in ways which increase 
information asymmetries.  They have incentives for non-transparency—so evident 
in the recent crisis. 
 Securitization, for all its virtues in risk diversification, created whole new 
sets of agency problems and conflicts of interests,37 some of which had been 
anticipated even as the securitization movement was in its infancy (see Stiglitz 
1992).   
But securitization, and risk diversification more generally, attenuated 
incentives to gather information.  This is an inherent problem, which the 
advocates of securitization ignored.  They believed in efficient markets, failing to 
recognize the internal inconsistency in the efficient markets hypothesis:  If 
markets perfectly conveyed information (as the advocates of informationally 
efficient markets claimed), then there would be no incentives to gather 
information (Grossman and Stiglitz 1976; 1980).  Systems that disperse risk 
inherently weaken “accountability” and incentives not just for gathering 
information, but for ensuring the “quality” of the financial products being 
produced.  If diversification leads to an attenuation of incentives for obtaining 
good information,38 it can lead not only to poorer overall performance, but more 
instability.  Hence, the trade-off is markedly different than has traditionally been 
envisaged in the securitization literature, where it was presumed that 
securitization would lead to enhanced systemic stability.   
                                                
37 See, for instance, Stiglitz, 2010b.  What was remarkable was that market participants (in 
particular investors) seemed almost oblivious to these problems.  Credit rating agencies used past 
data to estimate default probabilities, even though the quality of mortgages being written had 
greatly deteriorated—reflecting the changed incentives that had resulted from securitization.   
38 As in Calvo and Mendoza (2000). 
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By the same token, because markets that are fully transparent are more 
competitive, and less profitable, there are strong market incentives for reducing 
and impeding transparency.  
Networks and Linkages 
This paper has focused on the consequences of risk sharing arrangements among 
countries, but the analysis is equally applicable to risk sharing arrangements 
among firms. Most of the literature on architecture has, in fact, focused on 
financial markets, not linkages among countries (Gallegati et al. (2008) is an 
exception).39   The central results are (a) economic architecture matters; and (b) 
private incentives are not necessarily aligned with those of society.   
Our analysis has focused on linear risk sharing contracts, but actual 
markets employ far more complex (and far riskier) non-linear contracts, whose 
motivation is not just risk sharing.  They arise out of differences in judgments 
about probabilities.   
One of the key issues upon which we have focused—how risk-sharing 
arrangements can lead a “crisis” in one country to generate a crisis in other 
countries with which it is connected has its parallel in the financial literature:  
how a bankruptcy of one firm can generate a bankruptcy cascade (Allen and Gale, 
2001; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003).  The structure of the credit market (its 
architecture) affects the probability of such a cascade. 
In the context of cross-country capital flows, we have shown how capital 
controls can ameliorate the risks of contagion.  Some have suggested that 
“resolution authority” provides a parallel mechanism in financial markets.40  I am 
not sure that is the case, for several reasons:  First, at best, resolution authority can 
be thought of as a form of “pre-emptive bankruptcy,” protecting depositors (and 
thereby the government, as a result of its implicit or explicit obligation to 
depositors); but it is designed to ensure that others (including bondholders) bear 
losses, thereby still exposing the system to the risk of a bankruptcy cascade, 
though perhaps one that might not be as serious as would have occurred had such 
pre-emptive actions not been undertaken.  Secondly, there is a concern that 
governments will be reluctant to exercise resolution authority in time of crisis, 
                                                
39 While, as we have noted, most of the finance literature ignored these issues, there is by now a 
growing literature exploring the consequences of what I call financial architecture.  These include 
Allen and Gale (2001); Allen and Babus (2009); Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2010); 
Arinaminpathy, Kapadia and May (2010), Battiston et al., (2007, 2009); Boissay (2006); Boss, 
Summer and Thurner (2004); Castiglionesi and Navarro (2008); Delli Gatti et al. (2006, 2009); De 
Masi et al (forthcoming); Eisenberg and Noe (2001); Friexas, Parigi and Rochet (2000); Gai and 
Kapadia (2010a, 2010b); Haldane (2009); Haldane and May (2010); Nier et al. (2007); and  Shin 
(2008). 
40 For a discussion of these issues, see, e.g.  Bank of England (2009a)). 
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just as the American government was reluctant to the powers at its disposal in the 
recent crisis.41  By contrast, there are natural incentives on the part of 
governments facing capital outflows in times of crisis to impose capital controls.42 
In short, in the analysis of systemic risk associated with alternative 
architectures, it should not be assumed that resolution authority will either be 
invoked or be fully effective.  To avoid systemic risk, there will need to be 
restrictions in the set of admissible risk contracts—recognizing that contractual 
arrangements that may be privately profitable may be socially undesirable.   
Regulatory problems 
More generally, policies and rules endogenously determine the extent and form of 
risk taking and the nature of risk-sharing arrangements.  Different policy 
frameworks (rules of the game) can lead to different financial architectures; some 
architectures may be more stable, with less risk of systemic failure, some may 
provide better incentives for gathering and processing information, some may be 
more efficient.   
A major objective of the research agenda, of which this paper is a part, is 
to ascertain what rules of the game (regulations) might lead to better outcomes. 
For instance, the regulatory system itself contributed to these cyclical 
fluctuations; they acted in a pro-cyclical manner.  For years before the 2008 crisis, 
academic economists had called for macro-prudential regulations to offset these 
effects.  (See Griffith-Jones, Ocampo and Stiglitz (2010), and the references cited 
there;  Bank of England (2009b), and Turner (2009).  For a broader discussion of 
the problems with the Basel II regulatory regime, see Danielsson et al. (2001).) 
Earlier, we stressed the importance of bankruptcy.  The laws governing 
bankruptcy affect the risks which market participants are willing to bear.  It is 
even possible that well-designed bankruptcy laws can contributed to systemic 
stability.43  In the other direction, some have argued that America’s bankruptcy 
reform of 2005 may have contributed to the housing bubble (Stiglitz 2010b). 
Cognitive equilibrium and herding 
                                                
41 In particular, politically influential bondholders will argue—as they did in the recent crisis—that 
forcing them to take a “haircut” will have systemically calamitous effects.   
42 In the past, pressures from the financial markets were exerted not to impose such controls; but 
increasingly, governments, and even the IMF, have come to recognize the desirability of imposing 
such controls, at least under certain circumstances.   
43 See, for instance, Miller and Stiglitz (forthcoming, 1999).   
Financial and capital market liberalization contributed to the contagion of the 
crisis that was borne in part from financial sector deregulation and the belief that 
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all that Central Banks needed to do to ensure stability and growth was to maintain 
inflation at low levels.  These ideas had become the fashion of the day, as were 
other widely held tenants, such as that because risk was spread so widely, the 
economic system was far more stable, able to manage virtually any risk that it 
might face. 
Hoff and Stiglitz (2010) describe how individuals beliefs affect both 
behavior and how they gather and process information; they process information 
in a way which reinforces preconceptions, so that there can be equilibrium 
fictions.  Thus advocates of the efficient markets hypothesis and related doctrines, 
both within the private and public sector, dismissed evidence to the contrary.  
Anand, Kirman and Marsili (2010) construct a model in which there is an 
equilibrium in which no one scrutinizes the mortgages embedded in MBS’s, in 
part because they know that when they come to sell the securities, no one will 
monitor the constituent mortgages.   
But belief systems can change rapidly; the equilibrium supported by this 
particular belief system can quickly disappear.44  This crisis, for instance, showed 
(or should have shown) that prevailing beliefs might not be correct, and in doing 
so dramatically increased uncertainties (in effect, reducing the “false” certainties 
to which previous systems had given rise).  
Such changes in belief systems can give rise to contagion:  ideas flow 
easily from one place to another.  Economic connectivity of the kind upon which 
we have focused may accelerate such contagion, but it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient.   
XI. Concluding comments 
We have constructed a simple model in which, in the absence of system failure, 
full liberalization would be desirable.  But with full liberalization, a “failure” in 
one part of the system (in one country) can result (through contagion) in system 
failures in other countries. We show that if we can only have full liberalization or 
no liberalization amongst a set of countries, then no liberalization may be 
preferable.   
But these are not the only choices available.  We have argued that 
attention needs to be focused on the design of economic architecture, on the 
nature of, say, risk sharing relationships among countries.  However, if we can 
impose restrictions on capital flows (create circuit breakers), then it will, in 
general, be desirable to do so.  Without circuit breakers, no liberalization may be 
                                                
44 See, for instance, Bikhchandani et al 1992 
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preferable to liberalization; but with circuit breakers, a higher degree of 
integration may be desirable.  In the context of one simple model, we showed that 
there is an optimal size of the “club” amongst whose members there is full 
liberalization.  If the different clubs can be linked together, with limited capital 
flows between them, it may be desirable to do so.   
There is a broader question, which we not have been able to address in this 
paper, and that is the optimal architecture, especially in the case of countries of 
different sizes.  There is an obvious question:  Is it better to have clubs of similar 
sized countries?  But there is a more general set of questions:  If, for instance, 
various countries can be linked together with different degrees of integration 
(different parameters at which the circuit breakers are tripped), is it optimal to 
have all countries symmetrically interlinked, or is it desirable to have clusters of 
countries that are closely interlinked, with the clusters then loosely interlinked?  If 
there are a few large countries, is it optimal to have these large countries act as 
nodes in a network, with the nodes linked to each other? We suspect that, under a 
variety of conditions, optimal network design in fact entails asymmetries in 
linkages, with large countries that are better able to withstand shocks serving as 
nodes in the network. 45  
We have noted that while we have couched most of the analysis of this 
paper in terms of linkages among countries, much of what we have said is equally 
applicable to linkages among financial institutions.   
Pictures of observed patterns of linkages in credit markets (Haldane 
[2009], De Masi et al. [forthcoming]) often exhibit architectures with a few 
nodes, with different banks linked closely to one or another node, and these “big 
banks” linked with each other.  Such a system may be able to absorb small shocks 
(problems in one or more banks linked to a particular node are diffused well 
throughout the system), but large correlated risks can give rise to systemic risk.  
Our analysis has provided insights into why that may be the case. 
The question of optimal risk architecture, assessing the risk properties 
associated with these different architectures, is one that we hope to investigate in 
a subsequent paper. 
  
                                                
45 Models of banking have analyzed how bank interdependence can give rise to bankruptcy 
cascades.  The likelihood of such cascades is related to the structure of interconnectedness.  See 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003), Allen and Gale (2001), Haldane and May (2010).   
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